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 Cross-Hedging of Correlated Exchange Rates
Abstract
This paper examines the behavior of a competitive exporting rm that exports to
two foreign countries under multiple sources of exchange rate uncertainty. The rm
has to cross-hedge its exchange rate risk exposure because there is only a forward
market between the domestic currency and one foreign country's currency. When the
rm optimally exports to both foreign countries, we show that the rm's production
decision is independent of the rm's risk attitude and of the underlying exchange
rate uncertainty. We show further that the rm's optimal forward position is an over-
hedge or an under-hedge, depending on whether the two random exchange rates are
positively or negatively correlated in the sense of expectation dependence.
JEL classication: D21; D24; D81; F31
Keywords: Correlated exchange rates; Cross-hedging; Exports; Production
1. Introduction
The literature on international rms under exchange rate uncertainty has exten-
sively studied how currency forward/futures hedging aects the behavior of these
rms (see, e.g., Katz and Paroush, 1979; Benninga et al., 1985; Kawai and Zilcha,
1986; Broll and Zilcha, 1992; Broll et al., 1999; to name just a few). Two notable
results, the separation and full-hedging theorems, emanate. The separation theorem
states that the optimal production decisions are independent of rms' risk attitude
and of the underlying exchange rate uncertainty if there are currency forward/futures
markets for hedging purposes. The full-hedging theorem states that rms should
completely eliminate their exchange rate risk exposure by adopting a full-hedge if
2currency forward/futures markets are unbiased.
While currency hedging is useful for international rms, forward/futures markets
need not be readily available for all currencies in general, and are typically absent in
many less developed countries in particular (see Eiteman et al., 2009).1 International
rms may as such have to avail themselves of forward contracts on related currencies
to cross-hedge their exchange rate risk exposure (see, e.g., Anderson and Danthine,
1981; Eaker and Grant, 1987; Broll, 1997; Broll and Eckwert, 1999; Chang and Wong,
2003).
The purpose of this paper is to examine the optimal export and hedging decisions
of a competitive exporting rm in a cross-hedging context. Following the expected
utility model of Battermann et al. (2006), we consider the rm that exports to
two foreign countries under multiple sources of exchange rate uncertainty. There
are no hedging instruments between the domestic currency and one foreign country's
currency. The rm, however, has access to an unbiased forward market between the
home currency and the other foreign country's currency for cross-hedging purposes.
We show that the separation theorem holds when the rm optimally exports to the
foreign country with the currency forward market. The full-hedging theorem, on the
other hand, holds only when the rm exports exclusively to the foreign country with
the currency forward market. In the more interesting case wherein the rm exports
to both foreign countries, we show that the rm's optimal forward position is an over-
hedge or an under-hedge, depending on whether the two random exchange rates are
positively or negatively correlated in the sense of expectation dependence (Wright,
1987). Our results thus rene those of Battermann et al. (2006) by introducing the
expectation dependence structure to describe the multiple sources of exchange rate
uncertainty.
1Even if some less developed countries have currency forward contracts, these contracts are
deemed to be forward-cover insurance schemes that are not governed by market forces (see Jacque,
1996).
3The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates the model of
a competitive exporting rm in a cross-hedging context. Section 3 derives the rm's
optimal export and hedging decisions. The nal section concludes.
2. The model
Consider a competitive exporting rm under exchange rate uncertainty. To begin,
the rm produces a single commodity according to a deterministic cost function,
c(x), in the domestic country, where x  0 is the output level. The rm's production
technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale so that the cost function, c(x), satises
that c0(0) = c0(0) = 0, and c0(x) > 0 and c00(x) > 0 for all x > 0. The rm exports
its entire output, x, to two foreign countries, indexed by i = 1 and 2. Let xi be the
amount of exports sold in country i, where xi  0 for i = 1 and 2, and x1 + x2 = x.
The selling price of the commodity in country i is exogenously xed at pi per unit,
where pi > 0 is denominated in country i's currency for i = 1 and 2.
The exchange rate uncertainty comes from two sources, ~ e1 and ~ e2, that denote
the random exchange rates expressed in units of the domestic currency per unit of
country 1's currency and per unit of country 2's currency, respectively.2 Let Fi(ei) be
the marginal cumulative distribution function (CDF) of ~ ei over support [ei;ei] with
0 < ei < ei for i = 1 and 2, and G(e1;e2) be the joint CDF of ~ e1 and ~ e2 over support
[e1;e1]  [e2;e2]. Cross-hedging is modeled by allowing the rm to trade innitely
divisible forward contracts between the domestic and country 1's currencies at the
forward rate, e
f
1, expressed in units of the domestic currency per unit of country 1's
currency. To focus on the rm's pure hedging motive, we assume that the forward
contacts are unbiased in that e
f
f = E(~ e1), where E() is the expectation operator
2Throughout the paper, we use a tilde () to denote a random variable.
4with respect to G(e1;e2).3 There are, however, no direct hedging instruments for the
random exchange rate, ~ e2.
The rm's prot, denominated in the domestic currency, is given by
~  = ~ e1p1x1 + ~ e2p2x2   c(x1 + x2) + [E(~ e1)   ~ e1]h; (1)
where h is the number of the forward contracts sold (purchased if negative) by the
rm. We say that the forward position, h, is an under-hedge, a full-hedge, or an over-
hedge, depending on whether h is less than, equal to, or greater than the amount of
sales in country 1, p1x1, denominated in country 1's currency, respectively.
The rm is risk averse and possesses a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function,
u(), dened over its domestic currency prot, , with u0() > 0 and u00() < 0. The
rm's ex-ante decision problem is to choose amounts of exports, x1 and x2, and a














2)]g  0; (3)
Efu
0(~ 









)[E(~ e1)   ~ e1]g = 0; (5)
3If e
f
1 > (<) E(~ e1), the rm would have a speculative motive to sell (purchase) the forward
contracts.
5where an asterisk () signies an optimal level. If x
1 > 0, condition (3) holds with
equality. Likewise, if x
2 > 0, condition (4) holds with equality.4
3. Optimal export and hedging decisions
As a benchmark, we rst consider the case that the rm does not export to country
1, i.e., x1  0. In this case, the rst-order conditions for program (2) become
Efu
0(~ 
0)[~ e2p2   c
0(x
0




0)[E(~ e1)   ~ e1]g = 0; (7)
where ~ 0 = ~ e2p2x0
2   c(x0
2) + [E(~ e1)   ~ e1]h0, and a nought (0) indicates an optimal
level.











0 < 0; (8)





2)   E(~ e2)p2 =






0); ~ e1] = 0; (10)
4The second-order conditions for program (2) are satised given risk aversion and the strict
convexity of c(x).
5For any two random variables, ~ x and ~ y, we have Cov(~ x; ~ y) = E(~ x~ y)   E(~ x)E(~ y).
6respectively. It then follows from equations (8), (9), and (10) that c0(x0
2) < E(~ e2)p2.
Resume now the original case that the rm can export to both countries. We
state and prove our rst proposition.
Proposition 1. The competitive exporting rm has access to the unbiased forward
contracts between the domestic and country 1's currencies for hedging purposes. There
are three cases.
(i) If E(~ e1)p1  E(~ e2)p2, the rm chooses the optimal output level, x = x
1, that
solves c0(x
1) = E(~ e1)p1, and the optimal forward position, h = p1x
1, is a full-hedge.
In this case, the rm exports its entire output to country 1, i.e., x
2 = 0.
(ii) If c0(x0
2) < E(~ e1)p1 < E(~ e2)p2, the rm chooses the optimal output level, x =
x
1 + x
2, that solves c0(x) = E(~ e1)p1, and exports to both countries, i.e., x
1 > 0 and
x
2 > 0. The optimal amounts of exports, x
1 and x
2, and the optimal forward position,
h, solve conditions (3) and (4) with equality and equation (5) simultaneously.
(iii) If E(~ e1)p1  c0(x0
2) < E(~ e2)p2, the rm chooses the optimal output level,
x = x0
2, and the optimal forward position, h = h0, that solve equations (6) and
(7) simultaneously. In this case, the rm exports its entire output to country 2, i.e.,
x
1 = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
To see the intuition of Proposition 1, we recast equation (1) as
~  = E(~ e1)p1x1   c(x1 + x2) + ~ e2p2x2 + [E(~ e1)   ~ e1](h   p1x1): (11)
Given the forward hedge via the contracts between the home and country 1's curren-
cies, it is evident from equation (11) that the marginal revenue from exports to country
1 is locked in at the deterministic level, E(~ e1)p1. Since the marginal revenue from ex-
7ports to country 2 is ~ e2p2, which is stochastic, the risk-averse rm sells exclusively in
country 1 if the expected marginal revenue from exports to country 2 does not exceed
the deterministic marginal revenue from exports to country 1, i.e., E(~ e2)p2  E(~ e1)p1.
In this case, equation (11) reveals that the rm could have completely eliminated its
exchange rate risk exposure had it chosen h = p1x1 within its own discretion. Al-
ternatively put, the degree of exchange rate risk exposure to be assumed by the rm
should be totally unrelated to its production decision. The rm as such chooses the
optimal output level, x = x
1, that maximizes E(~ e1)p1x   c(x), which gives rise to
c0(x
1) = E(~ e1)p1. Since the unbiased forward contracts oer actuarially fair \insur-
ance" to the rm, the risk-averse rm optimally opts for full insurance by choosing
h = p1x
1, which completely eliminates its exchange rate risk exposure. These results
are simply the celebrated separation and full-hedging theorems emanated from the
literature on international rms under exchange rate uncertainty.
If E(~ e1)p1 < E(~ e2)p2, the rm nds it optimal to export to country 2. Consider
rst that c0(x0
2) < E(~ e1)p1 < E(~ e2)p2. In this case, selling in country 1 is optimal
and the rm equates the marginal cost of production to the deterministic marginal
revenue from exports to country 1. The optimal levels of exports, x
1 and x
2, and
the optimal forward position, h, are uniquely determined by solving conditions (3)
and (4) with equality and equation (5) simultaneously. While the rm's optimal
output level, x, is independent of its risk attitude and of the underlying exchange
rate uncertainty, the optimal amounts of exports, x
1 and x
2, are not, rendering the
partial collapse of the separation theorem. Furthermore, the rm may or may not
opt for a full-hedge, i.e., h may or may not be equal to p1x
1, without knowing the
specic joint probability distribution function of ~ e1 and ~ e2. Thus, the full-hedging
theorem fails to hold.
Consider now that E(~ e1)p1  c0(x0
2) < E(~ e2)p2. In this case, the deterministic
marginal revenue from exports to country 1 is not enough to cover the marginal cost
8of production at x = x0
2, the optimal output level should the rm sell exclusively
in country 2. Hence, the rm nds it optimal to sell exclusively in country 2 so
that x
1 = 0 and x
2 = x0
2. The optimal output level, x = x0
2, and the optimal
forward position, h = h0, are uniquely determined by solving equations (6) and (7)
simultaneously, from which we can see that neither the separation theorem nor the
full-hedging theorem holds.
As is shown in Proposition 1, the optimal forward position, h, is a full-hedge,
i.e., h = p1x
1, if E(~ e1)p1  E(~ e2)p2. On the other hand, if E(~ e1)p1 < E(~ e2)p2, we
















To determine whether h is an under-hedge, a full-hedge, or an over-hedge, we need
to impose some tractable dependence structure on ~ e1 and ~ e2. To this end, we dene
the CDF of ~ e2 conditional on the event that ~ e1  e1 as




over support [e2;e2] for all e1 2 [e1;e1]. Let E(~ e2j~ e1  e1) be the expected value of ~ e2
with respect to F2(e2j~ e1  e1). The following bivariate dependence structure, known
as expectation dependence, is due to Wright (1987).
Denition 1. The exchange rate, ~ e2, is said to be positively (negatively) expectation
dependent on the exchange rate, ~ e1, if
ED(~ e2je1) = E(~ e2)   E(~ e2j~ e1  e1)  () 0; (14)
for all e1 2 [e1;e1], where the inequality is strict for some non-degenerate intervals.











[F2(e2j~ e1  e1)   F2(e2)] de2; (15)
where the second equality follows from integration by parts. According to Lehmann
(1966), we can write Cov(~ e1; ~ e2) in terms of the CDFs, G(e1;e2), F1(e1), and F2(e2):

















ED(~ e2je1)F1(e1) de1; (16)
where the second equality follows from equation (13), and the last equality follows
from equation (15). From Denition 1 and equation (16), we have Cov(~ e1; ~ e2) > (<) 0
if ~ e2 is positively (negatively) expectation dependent on ~ e1.
Let () and () be functions of bounded variation. Cuadras (2002) proves that
Cov[(~ e1);(~ e2)] can be written in terms of the CDFs, G(e1;e2), F1(e1), and F2(e2):





[G(e1;e2)   F1(e1)F2(e2)] d(e1) d(e2): (17)


















































2)], and the second equality follows from Eq. (16). Since u00() < 0
and x
2 > 0 given that E(~ e1)p1 < E(~ e2)p2, Eq. (18) is negative (positive) if ~ e2 is
positively (negatively) expectation dependent on ~ e1. It then follows from Eq. (12)
and the second-order conditions for program (2) that the optimal forward position,
h, must be greater (smaller) than p1x
1, thereby invoking the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Given that the forward contracts between the domestic and country
1's currencies are unbiased, and that E(~ e1)p1 < E(~ e2)p2, the competitive exporting
rm optimally opts for an over-hedge (under-hedge), i.e., h > (<) p1x
1, if the ex-
change rate, ~ e2, is positively (negatively) expectation dependent on the exchange rate,
~ e1.
The intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows. Given that covariances can be inter-
preted as marginal variances, Eq. (12) implies that the optimal forward position, h,
is the one that minimizes the variance of the rm's marginal utility. If the exchange
rates, ~ e1 and ~ e2, are positively (negatively) correlated in the sense of expectation
dependence, a full-hedge that completely eliminates the risk due to ~ e1 is suboptimal
because the rm's marginal utility remains volatile as e2 varies. In this case, an over-
hedge (under-hedge) reduces the rm's prot as e1 increases (decreases), which is
more likely when e2 is higher. Given risk aversion, such a forward position is more ef-
fective in reducing the variability of the rm's marginal utility, thereby rendering the
optimality of an over-hedge (under-hedge) if ~ e2 is positively (negatively) expectation
dependent on ~ e1.
114. Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the behavior of a competitive exporting rm
that exports to two foreign countries under multiple sources of exchange rate uncer-
tainty. While there are no hedging instruments between the domestic currency and
one foreign country's currency, the rm has access to an unbiased forward market be-
tween the home currency and the other foreign country's currency for cross-hedging
purposes. We have shown that the separation theorem holds when the rm opti-
mally exports to the foreign country with the currency forward market. However,
the full-hedging theorem holds only when the rm exports exclusively to the foreign
country with the currency forward market. When the rm exports to both foreign
countries, we have shown that the rm's optimal forward position is an over-hedge or
an under-hedge, depending on whether the two random exchange rates are positively
or negatively correlated in the sense of expectation dependence (Wright, 1987).
Appendix A
We formulate program (2) as a two-stage optimization problem. In the rst stage,
the rm chooses the optimal amount of exports to country 1, x1(x2), and the optimal
forward position, h(x2), for a given amount of exports to country 2, x2. In the second
stage, the rm chooses the optimal amount of exports to country 2, x
2, taking x1(x2)




and h = h(x
2).











0[~ (x2)][E(~ e1)   ~ e1]g = 0; (A.2)
where ~ (x2) = ~ e1p1x1(x2)+ ~ e2p2x2  c[x1(x2)+x2]+[E(~ e1)  ~ e1]h(x2). If x1(x2) > 0,
condition (A.1) holds with equality. Multiplying p1 to equation (A.2) and adding the
resulting equation to condition (A.1) yields
E(~ e1)p1   c
0[x1(x2) + x2]  0; (A.3)
since u0() > 0. For x2 suciently small such that c0(x2) < E(~ e1)p1, it follows that
x1(x2) > 0 and inequality (A.3) holds with equality. Thus, when x2 = 0, we have
E(~ e1)p1   c
0[x1(0)] = 0: (A.4)
In this case, h(0) = p1x1(0) solves equation (A.2) since (0) = E(~ e1)p1x1(0) c[x1(0)],
which is non-stochastic.
Let EU be the objective function of program (2) with x1 = x1(x2) and h =
h(x2). Totally dierentiating EU with respect to x2, using the envelope theorem,


















0[(0)][E(~ e2)p2   E(~ e1)p1]: (A.6)
If E(~ e1)p1  E(~ e2)p2, equation (A.6) implies that x
2 = 0. We then know from
equation (A.4) that x
1 solves c0(x
1) = E(~ e1)p1 and h = p1x
1. This proves part (i) of
Proposition 1.
13If E(~ e1)p1 < E(~ e2)p2, equation (A.6) implies that x
2 > 0. In this case, inequality
(4) holds with equality. Let us reformulate program (2) as a two-stage optimization
problem. In the rst stage, the rm chooses the optimal amount of exports to country
2, x2(x1), and the optimal forward position, h(x1), for a given amount of exports to
country 1, x1. In the second stage, the rm chooses the optimal amount of exports to
country 1, x
1, taking x2(x1) and h(x1) as given. The complete solution to program
(2) is thus x
1, x
2 = x2(x
1), and h = h(x
1).











0[~ (x1)][E(~ e1)   ~ e1]g = 0; (A.8)
where ~ (x1) = ~ e1p1x1 + ~ e2p2x2(x1)   c[x1 + x2(x1)] + [E(~ e1)   ~ e1]h(x1). Let EU
be the objective function of program (2) with x2 = x2(x1) and h = h(x1). Totally
dierentiating EU with respect to x1, using the envelope theorem, and evaluating the














2 and h0 are dened in equations (6) and (7). Substituting equation (7) into














2)  E(~ e1)p1, equation (A.10) implies that x
1 = 0. Thus, in this case we have
x
2 = x0
2 and h = h0. This proves part (iii) of Proposition 1.
14Finally, if c0(x0
2) < E(~ e1)p1, equation (A.10) implies that x
1 > 0. In this case,
condition (3) holds with equality:
Efu
0(~ 
)[~ e1p1   c
0(x
)]g = 0: (A.11)
Multiplying p1 to equation (5) and adding the resulting equation to equation (A.11)
yields c0(x) = E(~ e1)p1, since u0() > 0. The optimal amounts of exports, x
1 and x
2,
and the optimal forward position, h, then solve conditions (3) and (4) with equality
and equation (5) simultaneously. This proves part (ii) of Proposition 1.
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